記者｜石劼

小威廉·克雷·福特先生臺(tái)鑒：

去歲年末，福特在華2025戰(zhàn)略發(fā)布會(huì)上曾聆君麈論，而今不睹芝儀，瞬又半載。

從2008年美國車企集體陷入危機(jī)，到2018年福特在華低迷決意整改，兩個(gè)波谷間距恰巧十年；2025戰(zhàn)略對(duì)比“1515規(guī)劃”，兩個(gè)節(jié)點(diǎn)間距又是十年。自1903年令曾祖亨利·福特締造福特汽車公司至今，歷時(shí)115年，其實(shí)也就是十余個(gè)十年組成。從2015到2025，能否從成功走向另一個(gè)轉(zhuǎn)敗為勝，其意義便也不言而喻。

您曾經(jīng)反駁“福特衰退說”，堅(jiān)稱到2020年福特?zé)o論產(chǎn)品線還是展廳均將更光彩奪目，但我們知道那是面向投資人的演說。過去的十年里，福特的確創(chuàng)下過新的成績，譬如曾在Navigant Research自動(dòng)駕駛排行榜高居前列，然而，和另一組消息相比便黯然失色：從福特中國乃至全球人事地震，到在華銷量陷入低迷、全球利潤跌落19%，以及退出日本市場(chǎng)、北美轎車市場(chǎng)，在澳洲關(guān)閉了工廠……

事實(shí)面前無須諱疾忌醫(yī)。我仿佛看見閣下在棋盤前逡巡良久，砰然落子之后微顫的手隱隱透出焦慮和期盼。

福特，這個(gè)擁有百年歷史、拉開汽車產(chǎn)業(yè)技術(shù)革命先河的偉大品牌，到底怎么了？汽車媒體紛紛打算向您提出這個(gè)問題，但我知道您也一定想問行業(yè)觀察人士這個(gè)問題究竟該給出什么答案。在此，總結(jié)出三對(duì)關(guān)鍵詞，愿以淺見一二見笑于大方之家。

第一對(duì)：冷與熱

您一定還記得，四五年前“在華銷量增速最高外資車企”這頂熱度逼人的桂冠曾屬于福特。2013年到2016年，19%到49%的輝煌增幅，讓福特的名字在中國熠熠生輝。然而自2016年經(jīng)銷商沖突事件以來，福特在華銷量急轉(zhuǎn)直下，每一年都在縮水。2018年過了5個(gè)月，福特在華銷量也跌了5個(gè)月，降幅在11%到30%不等。這重嚴(yán)寒，在投資者大會(huì)上封凍了您五年前春風(fēng)得意的笑容。

這種180度大轉(zhuǎn)彎并不奇怪，市場(chǎng)就是這樣，當(dāng)你對(duì)它熱心耕耘，才有希望收獲金燦燦暖洋洋的果實(shí)；而當(dāng)你對(duì)它冷落擱置，那么勢(shì)必被還以冷清清凄慘慘的結(jié)局。當(dāng)您任由福特在華路線從深耕轉(zhuǎn)為攫取時(shí)，卻不曾預(yù)料會(huì)在市場(chǎng)趨于飽和成熟之后銷量遇冷。

福特過去三年和今年以來在華銷量

如果您要尋覓福特在中國失去溫度的答案，請(qǐng)回想一下過去幾年給中國的“冷待遇”：媒體曾看著變化無幾的2016款翼虎大搖其頭，“1515規(guī)劃”之后中國長時(shí)間里未能迎來重磅新車，這是在新車安排上的冷落；當(dāng)小型SUV、大七座SUV、精品緊湊轎車成為緊湊SUV之后新一輪潮流時(shí)，我們看到福特在中國長期幾無作為，這是在市場(chǎng)趨勢(shì)把握上的冷淡；盡管經(jīng)銷商“起義”存在雙向利益爭奪，以及第三方撩撥的作用，但福特那些年肆意壓庫以換取一時(shí)佳績，這是對(duì)經(jīng)銷商生態(tài)和網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道的冷漠……

曾經(jīng)，一位時(shí)任長安汽車副總裁的高管對(duì)本刊記者抱怨稱：“對(duì)福特來說，美國市場(chǎng)最重要，中國嘛，要等等看！”那句話，刺骨的程度勝過了2011年的朔風(fēng)。我們?cè)疽詾椤?515”能讓福特在中國徹底走入春天，孰知接下來便是“冰河時(shí)代”。

是，福特正在針對(duì)軟肋進(jìn)行修正和填補(bǔ)。FSDD新經(jīng)銷店改造了服務(wù)消費(fèi)者的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，何駿杰先生也強(qiáng)調(diào)了同經(jīng)銷商的關(guān)系；2025規(guī)劃新車數(shù)量驚人，覆蓋范圍廣大……

然而僅僅在第一步構(gòu)建框架并不夠，宏偉目標(biāo)需要通過無數(shù)細(xì)節(jié)落地踏踏實(shí)實(shí)搭建起來，譬如50款新車中，能重新定義福特品牌的車型、能沖量的車型、充數(shù)的車型，分別有多少款？定價(jià)策略幾何？上市時(shí)機(jī)怎樣把握？如果蒙迪歐Energi這種眼下還不能走量或提升品牌的車型為主，您覺得“新車陣容”含金量又有多少呢？同經(jīng)銷商關(guān)系趨于緩和之后，他們先前的疲累與傷痛又如何去消解？能否確保整個(gè)銷售渠道恢復(fù)健康和備戰(zhàn)狀態(tài)？

要在中國這個(gè)最重要市場(chǎng)扭轉(zhuǎn)寒潮，還需要福特抱以百分百的熱情，貫穿到每一個(gè)角落，每一寸細(xì)節(jié)。

第二對(duì)：快與慢

身為中國人，我卻可以理解為何福特一度選擇在事實(shí)上對(duì)華“降溫”，嚴(yán)格意義上說，這是福特在全球?qū)θ加蛙嚇I(yè)務(wù)收縮的一部分，和放棄日本市場(chǎng)、澳洲工廠以及北美轎車業(yè)務(wù)如出一轍。因?yàn)?，汽車行業(yè)處于轉(zhuǎn)型大潮之中，所有人都知道新能源和智能汽車是方向，但如何邁步卻眾說紛紜。焦慮和迷惘蔓延到的范圍，遠(yuǎn)不止福特一家車企。

福特，想做那個(gè)跑得最快的選手。于是，現(xiàn)有的燃油車業(yè)務(wù)開始收縮，大量資金用于收購各種移動(dòng)出行初創(chuàng)企業(yè)，從投資Velodyne/Argo Al、收購SAIPS/Chariot，到將迪爾伯恩大樓改造成硅谷式園區(qū)，前任CEO馬克·菲爾茲的大刀闊斧一定曾令您倍感欣慰，于是能在他受到質(zhì)疑時(shí)站出來力挺。然而當(dāng)2017年利潤預(yù)期下跌至90億美元時(shí)，您對(duì)他的支持再也撐不住了。

難道您忘卻了2001年的那一幕？當(dāng)您解雇時(shí)任CEO的杰奎斯·納賽爾時(shí)，是否與16年后的心情相同？納賽爾和菲爾茲管理下的福特，失算之處都不是走得太慢，而是走得太快，差別之處在于納賽爾的目標(biāo)是電商，而菲爾茲的目標(biāo)是自動(dòng)駕駛，兩位都對(duì)前瞻方向心生向往，但都為了未來而放棄了當(dāng)下。

比爾·福特與馬克·菲爾茲

菲爾茲在接受CNBC電視臺(tái)采訪時(shí)曾風(fēng)發(fā)飛揚(yáng)：“汽車的自動(dòng)化將定義下一個(gè)十年，我們預(yù)測(cè)自動(dòng)駕駛汽車將為社會(huì)帶來積極影響，就如同100多年前福特汽車發(fā)明的流水線那樣”。他對(duì)趨勢(shì)的判斷并沒有錯(cuò)，只是當(dāng)前的燃油車業(yè)務(wù)依然是根本，未來固然美好，卻無法同現(xiàn)在之間形成割裂的斷層。您與菲爾茲都是電商潮流挫敗的見證者，因此吸取納賽爾教訓(xùn)的義務(wù)恐怕不僅僅歸于他一個(gè)人所有。

中國有句老話叫“欲速則不達(dá)”。福特是有雄心的車企，卻忘了慢的哲學(xué)——宏觀把控必須學(xué)會(huì)穩(wěn)健和踏實(shí)，屢屢因冒進(jìn)而受挫。

如果將目光再度聚焦到中國市場(chǎng)，2016年之前的壓庫舉措何嘗不也是“先激進(jìn)邁步，再重跌痛哭”的典型？在您的公司，不止一位員工告訴我們，中國業(yè)務(wù)增長方面“福特走得太快了”。

作為汽車世家的掌門人，您自然知曉空氣阻力的公式：F=(1/2)C*ρ*S*V2，速度越高則受阻越大。長安福特在2016年是最接近100萬輛銷量大關(guān)的一次，很遺憾地告訴您，隨著市場(chǎng)接近飽和點(diǎn)，往后再想邁過這個(gè)門檻的概率已經(jīng)極低了；福特在華總銷量的最高點(diǎn)，或許也會(huì)定格在那一年的127萬輛，能夠讓福特回味的大概也就是當(dāng)時(shí)最快的跨越速度了吧。

最快，卻未必是最遠(yuǎn)。

第三對(duì)：舊與新

時(shí)代變遷的速度堪稱日新月異，這也難怪車企都急匆匆地踏上了轉(zhuǎn)型的賽道。只是，有些公司身體跑在轉(zhuǎn)型的道路上，心卻還在舊時(shí)代，畢竟企業(yè)文化內(nèi)核和管理架構(gòu)的革新，比技術(shù)創(chuàng)新難度更大。

汽車行業(yè)保留著諸多家族式車企的痕跡，有些只是留下了一個(gè)不朽的名字，有些卻是迄今家族仍然掌控了管理之舵。在家族參與管理的車企中，包括：大眾、戴姆勒、寶馬、豐田、福特……

在舊的家族式、集權(quán)式管理框架下，不少車企已經(jīng)吃過苦頭。譬如集團(tuán)管理層全權(quán)掌控導(dǎo)致了多重領(lǐng)導(dǎo)、臃腫機(jī)構(gòu)和龐雜業(yè)務(wù)，因而大眾“排放門”和豐田“踏板門”過程中，問題其實(shí)早已暴露但卻因?yàn)楣倭胖髁x和傳達(dá)流程冗長，遲遲未能作出應(yīng)對(duì)。因而這樣的企業(yè)，雖強(qiáng)大有力，卻不善應(yīng)變，上下疏于溝通，許多問題被隱藏得不到解決。

必須承認(rèn)，福特在管理模式和企業(yè)文化上，可以算比較勇于革新。從令曾祖父亨利·福特先生篤信泰勒高效而不近人情的“科學(xué)管理”，到您的父親福特二世在晚年引入外部職業(yè)經(jīng)理人替代家族管理，已經(jīng)發(fā)生了重大轉(zhuǎn)變。但是，福特家族通過雙層股權(quán)體系依舊牢牢抓住了大部分表決權(quán)，這仍然意味著沒有對(duì)職業(yè)經(jīng)理人充分放權(quán)。即便管理層人士可以獲得股權(quán)激勵(lì)，也多半停留在分紅層面。因此有分析人士指出，這造成福特的職業(yè)經(jīng)理人側(cè)重短期業(yè)績，而忽視長遠(yuǎn)未來。

同時(shí)，官僚主義、集權(quán)主義和山頭主義依然存在于福特的架構(gòu)中。福特性能部的總設(shè)計(jì)工程師Jamal Hameedi和菲爾茲都曾透露過官僚主義的阻攔，菲爾茲甚至直指妨礙未來業(yè)務(wù)發(fā)展：“我們的應(yīng)對(duì)方式就是首先要打破自己，不能用福特的官僚主義作風(fēng)影響智能移動(dòng)的發(fā)展?！?/p>

很可惜，在這種架構(gòu)下，管理者容易分化為兩個(gè)極端，要么是疏懶遲鈍的官僚，要么是冒進(jìn)激越的冒險(xiǎn)者。

而至于集權(quán)和山頭，那么關(guān)于馬瑞麟先生執(zhí)掌長安福特時(shí)期為什么會(huì)爆發(fā)“斷軸門”，為何會(huì)選用南方天合劣質(zhì)羊角？以及為何羅冠宏擔(dān)任福特中國CEO不到半年便匆匆掛印離去，這里面福特亞太管理層扮演了怎樣的角色？我想您可能比我更清楚。

您給福特亞太、福特中國、長安福特分別安排了怎樣的定位和角色？非但我這個(gè)外部觀察者覺察到了一絲詭異的氣息，而且內(nèi)部人士的腹誹已經(jīng)不是一天兩天。較之福特亞太區(qū)的大權(quán)在握、長安福特的實(shí)際業(yè)務(wù)操作，福特中國能夠針對(duì)我們這個(gè)市場(chǎng)把控的環(huán)節(jié)少之又少，研發(fā)、制造、質(zhì)量、市場(chǎng)、售后……幾乎都是空白。

同樣是美國車企，通用汽車2013年將通用中國從通用國際運(yùn)營部獨(dú)立出來，反觀福特中國一直受困亞太區(qū)，本地化進(jìn)程無法充分放手。誠然，更高程度的本地化將導(dǎo)致部分就業(yè)崗位流失轉(zhuǎn)移，但卻能更好地應(yīng)對(duì)中國市場(chǎng)特化的需求。否則福特在中國將繼續(xù)被全球制度和流程所牽絆，產(chǎn)品、傳播等層面無法達(dá)成針對(duì)性和快速反應(yīng)的效果。區(qū)域架構(gòu)能否優(yōu)化，中國市場(chǎng)的管理權(quán)限能否放開，這是一項(xiàng)容易看清楚卻難以下決心的選擇。

而福特亞太和福特中國的派遣員工，占據(jù)了太多關(guān)鍵職位，您確保其中多少人能扎扎實(shí)實(shí)為一個(gè)區(qū)域或者一個(gè)市場(chǎng)奉獻(xiàn)自己的職業(yè)生涯，而不是匆忙“鍍金”幾年便離去？福特在華不力局面，您捫心自問，是否和自己的用人機(jī)制密不可分？

大象轉(zhuǎn)身，從來殊為不易。家族式車企巨頭，多半在思變。豐田章男的掌權(quán)模式脫離了家族管理的味道，戴姆勒打算拆分為乘用車、商用車和金融三家獨(dú)立法人公司，并引入吉利作為最大單一股東制衡守舊力量。那么您會(huì)對(duì)福特作出怎樣的調(diào)整呢？

福特，曾引領(lǐng)全球進(jìn)入流水線工業(yè)制造時(shí)代，而在這個(gè)工業(yè)4.0時(shí)代卻施展受限，眾目都聚焦在您和韓愷特先生身上。英雄史詩在世界大背景的光耀之下，究竟是相映還是失色？寫就福特這一段歷史的筆，就掌握在您的手中。

此致

石劼

《汽車公社》

2018年6月26日

Six Key Words for Ford’s Loss in China - A Letter for Mr. Bill Ford

Author/Shi Jie

Dear Mr. William Clay Ford Jr.,

It’s almost half an year since I saw you last time on “China Expansion Strategy 2025” Event in Dec, 2017.

Rather a coincidence. From 2008 crisis in the USA to Ford’s restart in China in 2018, as well as the time gap between the two growth plans in China, each is a step of one decade. For Ford, the 115 years history is composed of one dozen decades, so this decade is a key period for ford, of course.

Once you denied that ford declined in the name of more attractive portfolio and show rooms in 2020. Besides those words for investors, we know that ford did meet trouble these years, from sales volume downfall in China to your retreat in North American sedan market and Japan, even dimming your glory such as top position on Navigant Research self-driving rankings.

So what happened to Ford? We want to ask you. But I think you also want to get the answer from us. Hereby, I offer three pairs of key words for your reference.

No.1 Cold and Warm

Four or five years ago, ford owned the crown of the fastest growing foreign car manufacturer in China, enjoying a warm growth rate between 19% and 49%. Since 2016, however, the sales volume fell year by year while all the monthly deliveries numbers declined yoy in 2018, at the rate of 11% to 30%. So you could feel the chill from the newest numbers.

Market needs your cultivation with enthusiasm and warmth. If you do so, then you could get warm fruits. Conversely, you will have to confront a chilly wasteland if you play it cool. As ford grasp profit from China with a cold-blooded style, in stead of pleading heart and soul, the growth turned into downfall in a much saturated market compared with several years ago.

Ford brought cold wind to China firstly, then was rewarded with hailstones. First, the cold wind is in portfolio since there were few new models of importance launched in China after “15·15 Plan” completed. Take MY 2016 Kuga for example, it’s almost the same as the old model. Second, Ford acted slowly within the new trend of small crossover, 7 seat crossover and compact sedan after the popularity of compact crossover. The only explanation for the torpid reaction might be Ford ‘s freeze in the chilliness. At last, Ford once coerced dealers to pile up stock in a cold-blooded way, aiming to get better sales volume result. You treated the distribution channel as cold as ice, so you would get a frozen sales volume.

Once an executive from Chang’an Auto complained to us, “For Ford, the USA is the most important market, while China can wait for a chance.” That sentence is colder than the winter wind. We did wish to see “15·15 Plan” bring Ford to a brand new spring, however, an “Ice Age” was following.

I agree that Ford is improving, for example, it will launch over 50 new models in China before 2025, and found better relationship with dealers.

But the plan is just the basic architecture and the first step, you must implement it perfectly. The new portfolio should be made up of volume cars, profit cow cars, and models for lifting brand image and so on. Details such as price strategy and launch date also count. If most of the 50 new models are products as Mondeo Energi which could not enjoy hight volume in China, Ford will be lacking new model, still.

Due to your desire for success in China, you must devote your warm hear, wholeheartedly, from every corner and every detail.

No.2 Fast and Slow

In fact, the chilliness from Ford is not only for China, but also for the whole internal-combustion engine vehicle business as the whole industry is entering a transitional period towards green and intellectual mobility. Every car manufacturer knows that tomorrow belongs to alternative energy cars and connected cars, but how can we get there?

Ford always wishes to be the fastest runner. So we saw Ford put huge investment into new start-ups at the price of ICE vehicle business shrinking, under the management of Mr. Mark Fields. From investing Velodyne/A rgo Al to purchasing SAIPS/Chariot, as well as shifting Dearborn building into silicon valley styled park, you must appreciated Fields’ harvest in the field of new mobility. So you supported him when he met the first shock of criticism. When you receive a degraded profit forecast of 9 billion dollars, nevertheless, Fields lost your umbrella.

A Déjà vu for 2001 when you dismissed Mr. Jacques Nasser? Then common problem under the management of Nasser and that of Fields, is running to fast, but not to slowly. The difference between the two depended on their goal, i.e., Nasser for E-commerce while Fields for new mobility. Both of the two were longing for the future, but sacrificed today. Fields should undertake the responsibility of radicalness, however, you should also afford the price.

China, is also another example for the much-too-high speed of Ford. As Ford wished to get a better sales volume, overstock became the poisonous water to quench the thirst. Before 2016, Ford neglected the need of dealers ecology. Chang’an Ford almost get 1 million sales in 2016, when Ford seld 1.27 million new cars in China that year. But as the car market is turning more and more saturated, you could hardly break the records above.

There is an old China saying "More haste, less speed“. The faster you run, the more drag you have to afford. And higher speed temporarily never equals a farther destination.

No.3 New and Old

Enterprises must evolve their corporate culture while the world is heading into a new period. New shell with old core never works. There are many car manufacturers keeping familial people -run character, such as Volkswagen AG, Daimler AG, BMW Group, Toyota Motor Corporation, and, Ford Motor Company.

I know that Ford had changed a lot in the aspect of corporate culture and management mode, from Taylorism or say scientific management theory appreciated by your great grandfather, to professional manager system founded by your father, and to your attention back to the core business. Dual-class share structure, however, strips the owner sense from many professional managers. That’s part of the reason why sometimes Ford executives are eager to get more beautiful sales volume instead of a better development method. Under that circumstance, executives might go to two extremes, one for laggard bureaucrats, the other for radical adventurers.

From the aspect of centralization and "mountain strongholds”, why were there lots of  “axle crack” case happened from Focus to Fuga when Marin Burela took over Chang’an Ford? Why did they choose inferior steering knuckle supplied by CTCS? Why did Jason Luo quit his job as Ford China CEO after only several months? Ford Asia Pacific business was barrier for Ford China’s development, indeed. Do you know?

China is a special market, in the need of a specific department to control the business. Under Ford Asia Pacific, the localization can not be implemented thoroughly due to the global standard and procedure. For Ford China, it lacks power to control segments from R&D, manufacturing, QC, marketing to after sales and so on. GM China had come off GMIO since 2013, to improve the efficient by treat China as a special market, while Ford China always under control of Ford Asia Pacific.

I heard that many executives sent to Ford China from the USA never bore the ambition to improve the business but treat the position as a chance of gilding. So bureaucracy accumulated and the problems were rooted in the soil.

Ford, once guiding the whole world into the assembly line revolution, met bottleneck in the era of industry 4.0. Can Ford break the barrier and be great again? Now all the eyesight concentrates on you and Mr. Hackett. What will the history of Ford be like after many years? Now the pen writing down the history, is controlled in your hand.

Best wishes.

Yours,

Martin Shi

iAuto Shanghai

June, 26th, 2018

本文節(jié)選自《汽車公社》雜志6月刊封面故事